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Introduction 
 
 
Exploratory Talks and Peace Initiatives 
in Afghanistan 
Actors, Demands, Germany’s Role as Mediator 
Nils Wörmer 
It is widely held that NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan can only succeed if progress is 
made in the country’s internal peace process. But none of the initiatives to date have 
been able to initiate meaningful negotiations, nor has it been possible to reach lasting 
agreements on representatives, mediators, topics and procedures. Numerous actors 
have already been involved in exploratory talks involving both independent and inter-
connected threads. It would represent an important step forward if existing initiatives 
could be channelled into an orderly negotiating process. Germany can play an impor-
tant mediating role here. Talks about a political resolution of the Afghanistan conflict 
will be protracted and complex, their outcome open. Forward strategic thinking must 
also consider the possibility of the Afghan peace process failing. 
 
In July 2012 Afghanistan’s President Hamid 
Karzai again asked the German government 
for help in mediating peace talks. In 2010 
and 2011 Germany had arranged secret 
talks between representatives of the Taliban 
and the United States. By early 2012 these 
had led to the temporary establishment of a 
Taliban liaison office in Qatar. While many 
observers regard the “Qatar process” as the 
most promising initiative to date, it has 
been on ice since March 2012. It is not yet 
clear whether the German efforts will move 
forward or whether this mediation initia-
tive will fail too. 
During the initial years of the ISAF 
mission the United States and NATO cate-
gorically excluded top-level (strategic) talks 
of any kind with Afghan insurgents. But 
contacts have always existed at district 
and provincial level. 
Since 2002 the Afghan government has 
maintained communication of varying 
quality and intensity with the three main 
currents of the insurgency: Taliban, Islamic 
Party (Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) and 
Haqqani network. President Karzai’s posi-
tion on talks has sometimes appeared con-
tradictory, inviting insurgent leaders to 
talks in Kabul and guaranteeing them safe 
passage while excluding such talks (appar-
ently at U.S. behest) in official pronounce-
ments. At the latest since 2008, however, 
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Kabul appears to be earnestly interested in 
talks at the highest level, above all with the 
Taliban and the HIG. 
The various past initiatives reveal which 
actors wish to be involved in future nego-
tiations, which representatives are accept-
able, and who comes into question as 
mediator. They also supply insights into 
the core demands of the parties, the inter-
ests of external actors and ultimately the 
room available for compromise. 
Initiatives to Date 
Saudi activities. At Kabul’s request the 
Saudi government organised in 2008 and 
2009 the first initiative leading to direct 
high-level contacts between the Afghan 
government, the Taliban and the HIG. After 
troublesome experiences with the Taliban 
in the 1990s, Riyadh was initially cautious 
and made its core concern – that the Tali-
ban openly distance itself from al-Qaeda – 
a precondition for future engagement in 
the Afghan peace process. 
The first of two rounds of talks came 
about in September 2008, in the guise of 
an invitation from King Abdullah to break 
fast together at the end of Ramadan. The 
Afghan government was indirectly repre-
sented at both meetings by the President’s 
older brother Qayum Karzai, who holds no 
government office. Apparently no official 
representatives of the HIG and Taliban 
leaderships participated in the first round, 
with only former functionaries attending 
the meeting in Mecca. The latter included 
the last foreign minister of the Taliban gov-
ernment, Mulla Ahmad Wakil Mutawakil, 
and the Taliban’s former ambassador to 
Pakistan, Mulla Abdul Salam Zaeef. Partici-
pation in the second round in February 
2009, chaired by the head of the Saudi intel-
ligence service, Prince Muqrin bin Abdul-
Aziz, was higher-ranking: the HIG repre-
sented by Ghairat Bahir, son-in-law of its 
leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; the Taliban 
by Mulla Agha Jan Mutassim, a son-in-law 
of Mulla Omar and former chair of the 
political committee of the Taliban leader-
ship council, the rahbari shura. 
In both rounds the Saudi government 
apparently offered Mulla Omar and Gul-
buddin Hekmatyar permanent or tempo-
rary sanctuary in Saudi Arabia if a political 
resolution of the conflict could be reached. 
British diplomats were involved in prepar-
ing the second round, which also discussed 
the possibility of power-sharing with the 
Taliban. 
The international community explicitly 
welcomed the Saudi initiative, with only 
the Iranian government expressing strong 
criticism and thereby staking its claim to 
a role in any Afghan peace deal. The Saudi 
role is also controversial in Afghanistan, 
meeting rejection by Shiite groups and 
individual leaders of the former Northern 
Alliance. Although repeatedly mentioned 
by President Karzai over the past three 
years, the Saudi initiative remains in 
abeyance. 
Talks on the Maldives. Three inofficial 
meetings between representatives of the 
Afghan government, the Taliban, the HIG 
and the non-militant opposition took 
place on the Maldives in January, May and 
November 2010. While the initiative had 
little influence on the substance of the 
peace process, Afghan observers nonethe-
less regard it as significant for its contribu-
tion to confidence-building and establish-
ing contacts. 
The initiative was proposed by Homay-
oun Jarir, another of Hekmatyar’s sons-in-
law. The Afghan government was not in-
cluded in the preparations for the talks, 
which were funded privately by Afghan 
businessmen, and repeatedly indicated that 
it did not expect them to advance the peace 
process. Although President Karzai rejected 
the initiative, he sent close personal ad-
visers as observers to all three rounds of 
talks. HIG and Taliban were represented by 
associated parliamentarians and provincial 
governors. Hekmatyar’s son Feroz also par-
ticipated as his personal envoy. Emissaries 
of the Haqqani network are reported to 
have attended the third meeting. 
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In the concluding declaration of the 
third round in November 2010 the par-
ticipants proposed establishing a “high 
national security council” to serve until a 
cease-fire could be concluded. The Council 
would have to confirm all government 
decisions by two-thirds majority before 
implementation. The meeting declared the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces and the 
cessation of all external attempts to inter-
vene in the peace process to be precondi-
tions for a cease-fire. As the next step the 
results of the conference were to be dis-
cussed with representatives of Pakistan 
and Iran. 
HIG initiatives. As well as participating 
in the talks in Saudi Arabia and the Mal-
dives, and countless smaller exploratory 
meetings within and outside Afghanistan, 
the HIG also opened up a separate, bilateral 
channel with the Afghan government. 
The first decisive move came in spring 
2008, after the release of Hekmatyar’s im-
prisoned son-in-law Ghairat Bahir. Numer-
ous secret meetings between Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar and various emissaries of the 
Karzai government followed, leading to 
the first direct talks between the Afghan 
President and a five-member HIG delega-
tion led by Qutbuddin Helal in mid-March 
2010. Helal, former deputy prime minister 
and Hekmatyar’s long-serving second-in-
command, presented the Afghan govern-
ment with a fifteen-point HIG peace plan, 
which has been thoroughly discussed since 
then. The HIG’s most important demands 
include full and complete withdrawal of 
NATO forces, an electoral law reform, new 
elections, and the preparation of a new 
constitution by the newly elected parlia-
ment. According to statements made by 
high-ranking Afghan government officials 
and HIG representatives in spring 2012, 
they had agreed in principle on many 
points of controversy, but the talks were 
deadlocked over the question of the pres-
ence of Western forces after 2014 and the 
status of the constitution. 
In May 2012 the HIG indefinitely sus-
pended direct talks with the Afghan govern-
ment in response to the signing of the Stra-
tegic Partnership Agreement between 
Afghanistan and the United States. Shortly 
beforehand, important representatives of 
the non-militant opposition had welcomed 
more unequivocally than ever before the 
prospect of a reconciliation between the 
Afghan government and Hekmatyar’s party. 
EU and UN exploratory talks with Tali-
ban leaders. Since 2007 various actors have 
endeavoured to arrange talks with top Tali-
ban commanders or confidants of Mulla 
Omar. 
In 2007 Michael Semple, the deputy to 
the European Union special representative 
for Afghanistan, held talks with high-rank-
ing Taliban that gave rise to much specula-
tion. When the Afghan government got 
wind of Semple’s diplomatic activities it 
expelled him, plainly wishing to underline 
that there was to be no contact with leaders 
of the insurgency without its participation 
or at least knowledge. 
Since spring 2009 Kai Eide, the head of 
the UN mission in Afghanistan, has met 
with high-ranking Taliban leaders several 
times at various locations. The last of these 
meetings, in early January 2010 in Dubai, 
discussed possible venues and conditions 
for future exploratory talks. According to 
Eide, this channel broke off in February 
2010 when the Pakistani intelligence ser-
vice arrested Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar 
in Karachi. Mulla Baradar was one of Mulla 
Omar’s deputies, chief military strategist 
and operative leader of the Taliban move-
ment. He is reported to have authorised 
the exploratory talks with the UN, and via 
emissaries opened up his own contacts to 
the Afghan government and probably also 
to the Iranians. 
In autumn 2010 it became known that 
the British intelligence service had, with 
the knowledge of the Afghan government 
and NATO, been in contact for several 
months with a man identifying himself as 
Mulla Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, mili-
tary leader of the Taliban and deputy of 
Mulla Omar. Only after several meetings, 
including one with President Karzai, did it 
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become apparent that the man was a fraud. 
Rather than a Taliban leader he was a shop-
keeper in the Pakistani city of Quetta. 
Qatar process. At the end of 2009 the 
German foreign intelligence service (BND) 
succeeded in establishing contact with 
Tayeb Agha, Mulla Omar’s former personal 
secretary. The first meeting was arranged 
in spring 2010 in Doha. In November 2010 
and again in May 2011 the BND brought 
Tayeb Agha to Munich, where he became 
the first emissary of the Taliban leadership 
to conduct direct talks with an American 
delegation from the State Department and 
intelligence services, conducted under the 
auspices of the German foreign ministry. 
The outcome of these talks was a series 
of confidence-building measures (though 
some also speak of a political deal that has 
yet to be implemented). The first part of the 
agreement was the opening of a Taliban 
liaison office in Qatar, which could serve 
as a forum for future talks between Mulla 
Omar’s emissaries and representatives of 
the international community. The United 
States and the Afghan government made 
the opening of the liaison office conditional 
on the Afghan Taliban distancing itself pub-
licly from international terrorism. 
The second part of the agreement related 
to an exchange of prisoners. The United 
States raised the prospect of transferring 
five high-ranking Taliban leaders from 
Guantánamo to Qatar, where they would 
be reunited with their families and placed 
under house arrest. In return the Taliban 
was willing to release three U.S. citizens, 
including Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl who 
they have held since June 2009. 
In mid-March 2012 the Taliban sus-
pended the liaison office and prisoner swap 
talks on the grounds that the United States 
was always adding new demands. But they 
indicated via various channels that this did 
not mean the end of the Qatar process. 
Not being involved in the talks, the Af-
ghan government was extremely reserved 
about this initiative. When it first heard 
of the talks, this caused a diplomatic upset 
with Qatar, and Karzai pointedly an-
nounced his wish to reopen the Saudi chan-
nel. Important leaders of the Afghan politi-
cal opposition have expressed reservations 
and stiff criticism of the Qatar process. They 
believe there should only be talks with the 
Taliban if all Afghan groups are included, 
especially those who fought against the 
Taliban before 2001. 
NATO Strategy and the Peace Process 
At the strategic level the United States com-
pleted a change of course with the new 
Afghanistan strategy unveiled by President 
Obama in March 2009, now declaring their 
fundamental willingness to conduct talks 
with “moderate Taliban”. NATO adopted 
central aspects of the new US strategy a 
month later at its summit in Strasbourg/ 
Kehl. Since then the topics of negotiation, 
reconciliation and reintegration of in-
surgent fighters have gradually shifted to 
the centre of NATO’s internal strategy 
debate. 
In 2009 and 2010 the newly elected 
President Obama’s administration deployed 
tens of thousands of additional troops for a 
limited period (the “surge”), with the objec-
tive of militarily weakening the three most 
important Afghan insurgent groups – Tali-
ban, HIG and Haqqani network – to a point 
where they had no alternative but to nego-
tiate. However, this strategy has largely 
failed. 
At the London Afghanistan conference in 
January 2010 the ISAF participants and 
the Afghan government laid out the coordi-
nates for a process that came to be known 
as “the transition”, during which ISAF 
would hand over responsibility for Afghan-
istan’s security to the Afghan security 
forces. The transition began in July 2011 
and is due to be completed by the end of 
2014. In London Karzai also announced 
that his government would hold a Peace 
Jirga in early summer 2010 to set in motion 
a national peace and reconciliation process 
and establish a reintegration programme 
for insurgent fighters, to be funded by the 
international community. 
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The Bonn Afghanistan conference in 
December 2011 and the NATO summit in 
Chicago in May 2012 were already making 
decisions about the time after 2014, for 
which a NATO-led training mission is 
planned. The Afghanistan conferences and 
NATO summits since 2010 have defined a 
series of areas in which progress needs 
be made if it is to be possible to withdraw 
fighting forces by the end of 2014 and 
stabilise Afghanistan in the long term. 
According to this, creating functioning 
Afghan security forces, strengthening the 
involvement and cooperation of neighbour-
ing states (especially Pakistan and Iran), 
improving governance and anti-corruption, 
and above all making progress in the in-
ternal Afghan peace process are precondi-
tions for the success of the NATO strategy 
in Afghanistan. 
The Afghan Government and the 
Peace Process 
Initiation of the process. As announced at 
the London conference in January 2010, the 
Afghan government organised a national, 
advisory Peace Jirga at the beginning of 
June 2010 in Kabul. In the resolution 
adopted at the conclusion of the three-day 
gathering chaired by former President Bur-
hanuddin Rabbani, the participants called 
for the appointment of a High Peace Coun-
cil, as a permanent institution to advance 
drive the government’s reconciliation pol-
icies and the peace process. The Jirga also 
drew up a comprehensive catalogue of 
recommendations to the Afghan govern-
ment, the leaders of the insurgency and the 
international community, proposing for 
example confidence-building measures 
such as the release of prisoners and the 
removal of the names of Afghan citizens 
from the United Nations sanctions list 
based on Security Council Resolution 1267 
of 15 October 1999. 
The Afghan government’s choice of chair 
and the sixteen hundred delegates to the 
Peace Jirga was highly controversial within 
the country. The HIG and the Haqqani net-
work rejected the Jirga, as did the Taliban, 
the latter moreover succeeding in staging 
a highly symbolic attack on the venue. A 
number of important opposition figures 
demonstratively stayed away. 
At the end of July 2010, in response to 
the demands of the Peace Jirga and the im-
mediately ensuing Kabul conference, the 
UN Security Council partly fulfilled a 
request that the Karzai government had 
submitted years earlier, and removed 
individual names from the sanctions list. 
While this initially affected five former 
Taliban leaders, another fourteen were 
removed in July 2011, leaving just 124 
names on the list. In June 2011 the list, 
which originally contained Taliban and 
al-Qaeda affiliates without distinction, had 
been divided into two separate documents. 
This step is regarded as an important pre-
condition for reintegration measures, and 
for the negotiating process itself. 
From the outset the manner in which 
the peace process was initiated came in for 
stiff criticism in Afghan domestic politics. 
The same applies to the instruments 
created to implement the process. 
High Peace Council. At the end of Sep-
tember 2010 President Karzai announced 
the establishment of the High Peace Coun-
cil, which the Peace Jirga can count as its 
most important achievement. The Council, 
again chaired by Burhanuddin Rabbani, 
comprises seventy members, which accord-
ing to a study by Afghanistan Analysts Net-
work (AAN) included fifty-three former or 
active members of the political-military 
organisations that fought in the Afghan 
civil wars of the 1980s and 1990s. The Coun-
cil includes ten women who, together with 
two men, are regarded as the representa-
tives of Afghan civil society. According to 
the study thirteen council members have 
ties to the HIG, while twelve held govern-
ment posts during the time of Taliban rule 
(1996–2001). Afghan civil society organisa-
tions believe that the government could at 
least have avoided appointing individuals 
accused of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 
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The High Peace Council has made but 
very slow progress, and has already suffered 
several severe setbacks. In September 2011 
Burhanuddin Rabbani was killed in his own 
home by suicide bombers posing as repre-
sentatives of the rahbari shura, the Tali-
ban’s highest leadership body. About half 
a year after the killing, President Karzai 
named Rabbani’s son Salahuddin as the 
new chair of the High Peace Council. A few 
weeks later Arsala Rahmani, a high-ranking 
member of the Council, was shot dead in 
his car in Kabul. Rahmani, who belonged to 
the “Taliban group” in the Peace Council, 
had been the figure regarded as most likely 
to be able to open direct communication 
channels to Taliban leadership circles. 
The High Peace Council, which is slated 
to play a central role in future negotiations 
between the Afghan government and the 
leaders of the insurgency, has for some 
time been facing accusations of ineffective-
ness, corruption and nepotism. Nonethe-
less, since taking over the chair Salahuddin 
Rabbani has succeeded in launching new 
initiatives. In summer 2012, in consultation 
with the Pakistani government, representa-
tives of the Council met with Mulla Abdul 
Ghani Baradar, a former deputy of Mulla 
Omar captured in Pakistan in February 
2010. It is speculated that he could mediate 
as an intermediary between the Afghan and 
Pakistani governments and the Taliban. 
In the scope of a new initiative to initiate 
peace talks, a High Peace Council delega-
tion led by Rabbani travelled to Pakistan 
in November 2012, where both countries 
called on the Taliban to distance itself fully 
and publicly from al-Qaeda. Both also 
underscored their intention to continue 
doing everything in their power to support 
the Afghan-led peace and reconciliation 
process. As a gesture of goodwill the Pakis-
tani government released at least twelve 
imprisoned Afghan functionaries and Tali-
ban commanders and raised the prospect 
of also freeing Mulla Baradar. 
Core Demands of the Parties 
Afghan government. Kabul demands 
that insurgent groups recognise the Afghan 
constitution, end the armed struggle and 
unconditionally cease cooperation with 
transnational terrorist organisations. It also 
asserts its right to the lead role in all nego-
tiating initiatives and wishes to be involved 
at an early stage in support measures by 
other governments, or at least kept fully 
informed. President Karzai has repeatedly 
invited both the HIG and the Taliban to 
participate in the upcoming 2014 elections 
after laying down their arms. It is unclear 
to what extent the current Afghan govern-
ment would be willing to negotiate serious-
ly about power-sharing with the Taliban. 
Political opposition. The most influen-
tial figures in Afghanistan’s highly hetero-
geneous non-militant opposition demand 
recognition of the constitution and the 
preservation of the country’s territorial 
integrity. Many opposition figures reject 
power-sharing with the Taliban. While 
some are willing to allow the Taliban to 
participate in elections, others wish to see 
the organisation dissolved and its leaders 
prosecuted. Leading politicians from the 
former Northern Alliance demand partici-
pation in all negotiation initiatives. 
Taliban. The Taliban do not recognise 
the Afghan constitution or government 
and demand the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces as a precondition for participation in 
peace talks. They see NATO and the United 
States as their main enemy and are willing 
to discuss only isolated issues with them, 
such as the establishment of a liaison office 
or prisoner exchanges. Otherwise, there 
appears to be scant room for compromise. 
In the case of the Haqqani network, a par-
tially autonomous group within the Tali-
ban movement, no clear stance on nego-
tiations is currently discernible. Many 
observers regard it as unwilling to nego-
tiate. 
Hezb-e Islami. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s 
organisation demands the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops and fundamental reforms 
of the electoral law and the constitution. 
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Unlike the Taliban, it at least recognises 
the Afghan government as a negotiating 
partner. 
United States and NATO. For the United 
States and NATO, acceptance of the Afghan 
constitution and recognition of the serving 
government are non-negotiable. Those are 
the core concerns to which the ambitious 
objectives of the early years of Western 
involvement have now been reduced. They 
also demand that the Afghan insurgents 
fully and unconditionally cease all cooper-
ation with transnational terrorist groups. 
It is unclear whether the United States 
requires the Taliban to publicly distance 
itself from al-Qaeda and recognise the Kar-
zai government as a negotiating partner as 
a precondition for establishing the liaison 
office or exchanging prisoners. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
To this day it has not been possible to ini-
tiate substantive talks between the conflict 
parties in Afghanistan. The peace process 
remains largely unstructured. The Afghan 
government’s talks with a fraudster and 
the murder of Burhanuddin Rabbani by 
an emissary underline the inadequacy of 
NATO’s and even the Afghan security 
forces’ knowledge about the Taliban’s in-
tentions, structures and decision-making 
processes. 
Neither in Afghan society as a whole 
nor among the main non-militant political 
groups is there any consensus about how 
the peace process should proceed. It is ques-
tionable whether the Karzai government 
and the High Peace Council can succeed in 
clearly defining the timeframe, partici-
pants, issues and venues before the 2014 
presidential elections. Germany’s great 
acceptance among all relevant actors, and 
not least the relevant experience already 
gathered in the Qatar process, would allow 
it to play a supportive role in the inevitable 
preparatory talks. 
It is becoming apparent that the nego-
tiations between the Afghan parties de-
manded by the international community 
will have to be accompanied by separate 
agreements on confidence-building mea-
sures of the kind discussed in the Qatar 
process or in the scope of the most recent 
Afghan-Pakistani initiative. Such talks 
plainly only have a prospect of success if 
they are kept secret as long as possible. 
Here too, Germany can continue to play an 
important mediating role and provide the 
required forum. 
All political and societal groups must be 
included in future negotiations between 
the Afghan parties, which should ideally 
be as transparent as possible. Pakistan and 
Iran should not be excluded, and at least 
kept informed about planned initiatives. 
In assessing the Qatar process it must be 
remembered that the central actor of the 
peace process – also according to the NATO 
strategy – was not involved. When the 
Afghan government tried to enter the pro-
cess, the Taliban objected, talks came to a 
halt and the initiative was regarded as hav-
ing failed for the time being. 
The positions of the serving Kabul gov-
ernment and the militant opposition cur-
rently appear to be mutually incompatible, 
especially where the status of the Afghan 
constitution is concerned. To that extent 
the goal often discussed in Western capi-
tals, of clearly advancing the peace process 
in the sense of substantive negotiations 
before the conclusion of the transitional 
phase in 2014, is also overambitious and 
unrealistic. NATO and the Afghan govern-
ment must also be prepared for the even-
tuality of the transition ending without a 
political solution in sight. 
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